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2 In essence
Doris Leuthard. (Photo : Vanina Moreillon)
3 My talk in a nutshell
• The liberalization of electricity markets alters pricing mechanisms 
for wholesale electricity.
• This has an effect on the effectiveness of energy and climate 
policies.
• Must be taken into account when coupling energy (bottom-up) 
and economic (top-down) models.
4Structure
• Electricity market liberalization and wholesale electricity pricing
• The ELECTRA framework
• Scenarios
• Results
• Conclusion
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TIMES electricity supply model  
In the CGE model, prices drive the decisions of economic agents!
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6Wholesale electricity pricing
Traditionally regulated market Fully liberalized market
Regulated prices:
• cover generation costs
• acceptable profit
Priced:
• at marginal cost
• including scarcity rents
Wholesale 
electricity 
pricing
• guaranteed acceptable 
return on investments
• subsidies (open or covert)
• scarcity rents reach the 
right level at equilibrium
Incentive for 
new capacity 
addition
price = AC + profit price = MC (incl. scarcity rents)Modeling
70 PART 1    Power Market Fundamentals
3. Personal communication from Joe Bowring, head of PJM’s Market Monitoring Unit, January 7, 2002.
4. Samuelson (1973, 623) comes close to using the term when he says “Competitively determined rents
are the results of a natural scarcity.” His definition of such rents is the long-run analog of the short-run
definition  of scarcity rent given here.
5. This is greater than short-run profit by the amount of startup costs and no-load costs which will be
ignored until Part 3.
an emergency operating range in their bids and the total capacity available in this
range is 1,900 MW out of a total installed capacity of about 60,000 MW.3 As long
as there is one such generator in a market, the market’s marginal cost curve is
continuous. Real markets always have well-defined marginal costs and the competi-
tive price equals that marginal cost. The difficulties resolved in this chapter only
matter for the “simplified” diagrams used by power-market analysts.
This book also will use the same simplified diagrams but without taking the
vertical segments literally. Such supply curves will have constant marginal costs
up to the nominal “maximum” output level, but above that marginal costs will
increase rapidly. If the supply curve is flat at $30 but the market price is $50, the
generator’s marginal cost will be $50 and it will produce on the steeply sloped
segment. When referring to such a generator, it is both wrong and confusing to say
its marginal cost is $30 as is the custom. To avoid this confusion, the marginal cost
of  gen rator’s supply curve to the left of the “maximum” output level will be
termed its variable cost. This is not entirely standard, but it is in keeping with the
term’s normal usage which refers to all costs that vary with the output level.
1-6.6 SCARCITY RENT
“Scarcity rent” has no formal economic definition but many popular
meanings.4 Although several are useful, most do not lend themselves
to careful analysis. However, one essential economic concept comes
close to the popular meaning. Scarcity rent will be defined as revenue
minus variable cost.5 Economics refers to scarcity rent as inframarginal
rent.
In the figure at the left, when demand is described by D1, both
generators are producing at full output, and load would be willing to pay
either generator more than its variable cost of production if it would
produce more. In this sense they are both scarce and both earn scarcity
rents.
With demand reduced to D2, as shown in the lower half of the figure,
generators of type G2 have excess capacity and are no longer scarce and
earn no scarcity rent; their variable costs equal the market price. Genera-
tors of type G1 are still scarce because load would be more than willing
to pay their variable cost if they would produce more. If G2 had a
variable cost of $1,000/MWh so that G1 were earning a rent of, say,
$950/MWh because G1 could not satisfy the entire load, G1 would
commonly be seen as in scarce supply. The above definition coincides
with an important concept of economics and with the common meaning of scarcity.
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European electricity market
2016
Largely liberalized market
Situation of overcapacity
⇒ no scarcity
⇒ no scarcity rents
⇒ no incentive to build 
new capacity Fully liberalized?
Or a mix ?
with capacity markets?
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• ELECTRA : Electricity markets and trade in Switzerland and its 
neighboring countries
• Project partners:
• EPFL, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
Sophie Maire, Philippe Thalmann, Marc Vielle, Frédéric Babonneau
• Econability, Mühleturnen
Frank Vöhringer
• PSI, Paul Scherrer Institute, Villigen
Rajesh Pattupara, Kannan Ramachandran, Hal Turton
• Financed by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy
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Cross-border Swiss 
TIMES Electricity Model
General equilibrium 
model (CGE) of the 
Swiss economy 
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Coupling
CROSSTEM-CH GENESwIS
electricity generation costs
•average 
•marginal 
electricity export revenue 
& import cost
input shares to electricity generation
wholesale electricity price
sectoral electricity demands
factor & intermediate input priceschanges to investment costs and 
operation and maintenance costs
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Scenarios
Pricing scenarios
Regulated
market
Liberalized 
market
Policy 
scenarios
Baseline
Tax scenario
BAU_REG BAU_LIB
TAX_REG TAX_LIB
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Scenarios
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Swiss BAU scenario
ETS scheme (linked with EU ETS)
CO2 tax on heating fuels and gas
Electricity tax (10% in 2020, 50% in 2050)
Increase CO2 tax
CO2 tax on transport fuels (from 2035)
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Costs and prices
Regulated market:
Price = AC + profit markup
Liberalized market
Price(>2025) = MC 
Liberalized market
Price(<2025) = f(AC,MC)
Wholesale electricity price assumptions with regards to average 
and marginal cost from the CROSSTEM-CH model.
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Variation btw scenarios&baselines
Pricing scenarios
Regularized 
market
Liberalized 
market
Policy 
scenarios
Baseline
Tax scenario
BAU_REG BAU_LIB
TAX_REG TAX_LIB
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•price for users ↑
•demand↓
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MC and AC variation
MC Regulated market
MC Liberalized market
Percentage change of the marginal cost and average cost in the TAX scenarios for 
liberalized and regulated markets, relative to the respective baselines
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AC&MC variation - Generation mix
MC Regulated market
MC Liberalized market
Electricity generation mix for the baselines and TAX scenarios for liberalized and 
regulated markets for 2030 and 2050.
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AC&MC variation - Generation mix
MC Regulated market
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Electricity generation mix for the baselines and TAX scenarios for liberalized and 
regulated markets for 2030 and 2050.
Electricity markets
ELECTRA framework
Scenarios
Results
Conclusion
Same marginal technologies
Same marginal cost
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MC and AC variation
MC Regulated market
MC Liberalized market
Percentage change of the marginal cost and average cost in the TAX scenarios for 
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MC&AC variation - system cost
MC Regulated market
MC Liberalized market
Electricity generation costs for the baselines and TAX scenarios for liberalized and 
regulated markets for 2030 and 2050.
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MC&AC variation - system cost
MC Regulated market
MC Liberalized market
Electricity generation costs for the baselines and TAX scenarios for liberalized and 
regulated markets for 2030 and 2050.
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AC Liberalized market
Higher share of variable costs
AC decreases with lower 
demand
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MC and AC variation
MC Regulated market
MC Liberalized market
Percentage change of the marginal cost and average cost in the TAX scenarios for 
liberalized and regulated markets, relative to the respective baselines
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Wholesale electricity prices variation
Wholesale electricity price
Liberalized market
Percentage change of electricity generation price in the TAX scenarios for 
liberalized and regulated markets, relative to the respective baselines
Wholesale electricity price
Regulated market
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Retail electricity prices variation
Wholesale electricity price
Liberalized market
Percentage change of electricity generation and retail electricity prices in the TAX 
scenarios for liberalized and regulated markets, relative to the respective baselines
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User prices variation
User price of electricity
Liberalized market
Percentage change of the user price for electricity in the TAX scenarios for 
liberalized and regulated markets, relative to the respective baselines
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Regulated market
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Electricity demand variation
Electricity demand
Liberalized market
Percentage change of electricity demand for the TAX scenarios for liberalized 
and regulated markets, relative to the respective baselines
Electricity demand
Regulated market
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Conclusion
Electricity markets
ELECTRA framework
Scenarios
Results
Conclusions
• In our simulations, an electricity tax is more effective in reducing 
electricity demand in a liberalized market than under cost-plus 
regulation
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YES* NO
fine
Do we use the right pricing 
assumptions?
adjust
Implications for Energy Modeling: Market liberalization matters!
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In any case, communicate the assumptions!
